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Notes
MODERN METTLE: THE MISCONSTRUED MORALITY
I. Tim Ppamic
"Get away from me, you slimy pimp, you're guilty as hell," roared
famous trial attorney Earl Rogers to the client he had just freed from
a murder charge.' Rogers' pithy utterance illustrates a legal dilemma
that to the popular mind is blatant immorality-the defense of a client
whose cause is highly unpopular or whose guilt is seemingly obvious.
When James B. Donovan told his wife that he had been appointed
counsel for Russian spy Rudolph Abel, his wife replied, "I talked
to everyone I met about it. Most said, 'Why should anyone defend
him."2 A friend abused Donovan because he had spent hundreds of
hours on Abel's defense-time, the friend said, he could have been
devoting to something worthwhile, "like legal problems of American
businessmen."3 Nor was it only the non-lawyer who was indignant.
Donovan reports that a lawyer said to him, "Here comes the mil-
lion-dollar Commie lawyer."4 And another lawyer asked him if his
sense of guilt were not overwhelming.
The teachings of utilitarianism have done much to influence pop-
ular Anglo-American thinking regarding the ethics of criminal defense.
Said Jeremy Bentham, "[T]he lawyer who, knowing from confession
of his client that such client has committed a felony, enables him by
his counsel to avoid suffering the punishment to which he is con-
demned, is . . . an accessory to such felony: viz., an accessory after
the fact."8 In America, Bentham's contemporary, David Hoffman of
the Baltimore Bar, published a guide to young practitioners:
I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use my
endeavors to arrest or impede the course of justice, by special resorts
to ingenuity-to artifices of eloquence .... [Thus, those who use their
talants] to screen such foul offenders from merited penalties, should be
regarded by all (and certainly shall by me) as ministers at a holy altar
full of high pretention and apparent sanctity, but inwardly base, un-
worthy, and hypocritical-dangerous in the precise ratio of their com-
manding talents and exalted learning.7
1 St. Johns, Final Verdict 97 (1962).
2 Lindemann, He Defended A Soviet Spy, Comet, Oct. 1960, p. 46.
Ibid.
4 Ibd.
5 Ibid.
6 G. Bentham, Rational of Judicial Evidence 474 (Bouring ed. 1850).
7 Z. Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 745, 751 (2d ed. 1836).
The 1960s are not free from confusion over this problem. Lawyers
have undertaken and in turn been criticized for the defense of such
unpopular clients as Caryl Chessman, James Hoffa, Jack Ruby and
Adolf Eichmann. It is time that the principles related to the defense
of the obviously guilty or an unpopular client be contemporarily
restated.
I. TEE STAGE
In order to arrive at a valid ethical judgment, we must first
postulate the nature of the trial system in Anglo-American law.
Ethics evolve from a system. If the system were changed, the ethics
would also change. The Continental system, for example, is based
on the assumption that truth will emerge through the independent
inquiry of paid public officials owing no partisan allegiance to either
side. Of utmost importance is the competence, thoroughness and
fairness of the public inquisitor. Because of unpleasant experiences
with the inquisitorial system-experiences summed up in the phrase
"Star Chamber'-England evolved the criminal adversary system.
Three other factors in English experience contributed to the de-
velopment of the adversary system: the concept of the devil's ad-
vocate in religion; the ancient trial by battle; and the competition,
self-interest, and individual initiative of the capitalist system of
economic organization.8
The adversary system is based on the pragmatic assumption that
the truth of any controversy has a better chance of being discovered
if each side fights as hard as it can to see that all the evidence and
rules of law favorable to its case are placed before the court.9
Lord Macaulay went so far as to say that we obtain the fairest
decision "when two men argue as unfairly as possible on opposite
sides" for then "it is certain that no important consideration will alto-
gether escape notice."10
The adversary system necessitates the keeping of the function
of judge, jury, and advocate distinct. The decision of the case is for
the judge, or for the judge and jury.
[Before judge or jury can] gauge the full force of an argument, it must
be presented .. .with partisan zeal by one not subject to the restraints
of judicial officer. The judge [or jury] cannot know how strong an argu-
ment is until he has heard it from the lips of one who has dedicated
all the powers of his mind to its formulation. This is the function of
the advocate. His task is not to decide but to persuade. 1
8 Barrett, The Adversary System and The Ethics of Advocacy, 87 Notre Dame
Law. 480-481 (1962).
9 Frank, Courts on Trial 80 (1949).
10 Ibid.
"1 Talks on American Law 31 (Berman ed. 1961).
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As the adversary system evolved, certain nascent principles be-
came fundamental rules.
Under our system of government the process of adjudication is sur-
rounded by safeguards evolved from centuries of experience. These
safeguards are not designed merely to lend formality and decorum
to the trial of causes. They are predicated on the assumption that to
secure for any controversy a truly informed and dispassionate decision
is a difficult thing, requiring for its achievement a special summoning
and organization of human effort and the adoption of measures to ex-
clude the biases and prejudgments that have free play outside the court-
room.
12
One of these safeguards is the legal presumption that an accused
is innocent until he has been found guilty by due process of law.
The responsibility is on the state to establish the guilt of an accused.
No man is bound to accuse himself, and his advocate must do noth-
ing inconsistent with the fundamental presumption of innocence. Earl
Rogers explained it this way:
[T]he presumption of innocence is the best thing in the jury system.
Having acted with full power to find the guilty man, we will now lean
over backwards to be fair to him. We will act as though he was in-
nocent, we will take upon ourselves the burden of proving he is guilty
beyond any reasonable doubt in the minds of twelve others who are his
equals. . . [B]etter a hundred guilty men go free than that one in-
nocent man be unjustly executed.' 3
Although a revered legal maxim, the presumption of innocence
is neither socially accepted nor fully understood. According to Clarence
Darrow, "It is all well enough to say that a man is presumed innocent
until he is proven guilty, but those who seriously make the statement
know nothing about psychology. As a matter of fact, most persons
who are accused are presumed guilty, and if a jury finds them not
guilty it is thought a miscarriage of justice."' 4
The public generally first hears of the crime by way of the news
media. The fact of the crime and the announcement of the apprehen-
sion and arraignment mesh in the mind of the public. If the crime
is sufficiently atrocious to arouse public indignation, there is an un-
conscious community desire to see the law swiftly punish the accused,
thus restoring the community balance. That many people believe the
law would not arrest unless the party arrested were guilty is aptly
expressed by Kafka in The Trial. Mr. K., when aroused from sleep
12 Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the As-
sociation of American Law Schools and The American Bar Association. (Ap-
proved by the AALS in 1958 and by the House of Delegates of the ABA in 1959)
[Hereinafter cited as Report].
13 St. Johns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17-18.
14 Darrow, The Story of My Life 203 (Universal ed. 1932).
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one morning to find himself arrested, protested his innocence to the
arresting warders. Answered the warders, "Our officials . .. never go
hunting for crime in the populace, but, as the Law decrees, are drawn
towards the guilty and must then send out us warders. That is the
law."'5
Yet the adversary system is considered by legal minds to be the
most just. It is a system that has evolved; it is experimental and has
developed to meet the demands of each age. Justice can be contem-
plated on several levels. The modem age no longer demands justice
in terms of utopia as, for instance, Plato did in The Republic. Justice
has been found to be a human term which must be interpreted and
applied in human situations. Thus, any system of justice will have
inherently certain flaws just as mankind itself is hardly a creature of
ultimate perfection. Given the initial safeguards, one of which is the
presumption of innocence and the distinct functions of judge, ad-
vocate, and jury, the Anglo-American legal system has found that:
... from the struggle between the litigants aided by their advocates,
each with ardor presenting one side of the case and each with the
utmost skill attempting to detect the weaknesses of his adversary's evi-
dence or points of law, the jury which must choose between the con-
flicting versions of the truth, and the court which is to select the ap-
plicable rules of law, will have before them, more often than not, the
relevant material from which to fashion by their joint efforts a just
decision.' 0
III. TBm PLAYERs
The status of the criminal practitioner today must be discussed
before we make an ethical judgment as to the defense of the guilty
or unpopular client. The attitude of law schools is the initial contribu-
tor to the image of criminal law today. Samuel Leibowitz feels that:
... no real effort has been made by the [law] school to prepare the
student to actually practice his profession-certainly not to step into
either a civil or criminal trial courtroom. In fact, the whisper has
filtered out of the faculty rooms of many leading law schools that crim-
inal law (except for the few law lectures which the professor delivers
during the two-or three-day-per-week, one-semester course) is to be
avoided and the criminal courts shunned as one would a pestilence.
17
Students, in the main, receive only introduction to the criminal law
in their class work. Moreover, the student receives little in the way
of meaningful experience and training in the art of advocacy and
15 Kafka, The Trial 9-10 (1937).
1 Barrett, supra note 8, at 481.
'7 Reynolds, Courtroom 39-391 (Popular Library ed. 1957).
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trial technique.' As Mr. Justice Clark has stated, many law schools
assign criminal law and procedure to the "'junk' heap."19
Numerically, the criminal defense lawyer is the legal jack-of-all-
trades; while the criminal specialists are found in the large cities.
20
There are three types of criminal attorneys in the modern megapolis.
First, handling the prostitution, gambling, drunken driving, disorderly
conduct, and similar cases is the lawyer whose law comes not from
the books but from practical experience. He more than likely has not
seen the inside of a law book since leaving law school. Often he will
have no office. His ability lies in knowing the temper of each judge
and prosecutor, and his counsel is a matter of personality juggling,
favors, and timing. He is a legal salesman, and, of the three types, he
handles the greatest number of cases. The second type is similar to
the regular part-time criminal lawyer known as the general prac-
titioner. The third type is the handler of the "white-collar" crimes-
the subtleties of business competition.m 2 Since the criminal lawyers
are the poorest paid members of their profession, only the big city
criminal specialist will have the requisite financial and social freedom
to handle highly unpopular cases.2 2 All of them will have both greater
temptations to unethical conduct and more difficulty with their clients
than other lawyers.
Two other practical considerations are important here. Most law-
yers try to avoid going into court. Many lawyers therefore are not
equipped by training and experience to assume the role of trial de-
fender. Most general practitioners are particularly reluctant to de-
fend when popular opinion or the instincts of the business com-
munity-the same opinion and instinct which are the source of the
lawyer's bread and butter-are against the accused. Moreover, one
partner in a firm "may be fired by a sense of injustice to accept a
brief that offers little hope of reward in fee or reputation, but the
thought that he may be taking bread from the mouths of his partners
is often a sharp deterrent to his Quixotic instincts."23
These factors led the Economist (London) to report that "the level
of professional competence and ethics at the criminal bar in the
United States is a cause for grave concern both among lawyers and
18 Id. at 892.
19 Clark, Utopia and Tomorrow's Lawyer, Student Lawyer, June 1963, p. 8:
"I say first that the law school should put more emphasis on the teaching of
criminal law and procedure. Rather than assigning it to the 'junk' heap, it de-
serves number one preferred treatment."
20 Steinberg, Professional Careers For the Defense Lawyer, Student Lawyer,
Apr. 1962, pp. 7-8.
21 Ibid.; Cf. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own 105-109 (1962).
22 Steinberg, supra note 20, at 9.
23 Sacks, Defending the Unpopular Client 8 (1961).
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laymen."24 The legal-ethical dilemma can best be summarized by the
following comparison:
The change in the character of the criminal Bar in the United States
over the last hundred years is almost as great as the distance between
Abraham Lincoln and Mr. Murray Chotiner. Lincoln began life as a
prairie lawyer whose varied practice included the defense of men ac-
cused of murder and the representation of major railroads. Mr. Chotiner,
who has helped to manage Vice President Nixon's meteoric rise has had
his career as a politician cut short by the discovery that he represented
several clients reputed to be big racketeers. It is not clear whether Mr.
Chotiner has been ostracized by the Republican high command because
of the character of his clients, or the nature of his representation of
them, but it is quite evident that few prospective candidates for polit-
ical office in the United States today would have the hardihood to
attempt to make their career at the criminal Bar, except as a public
prosecutor.
2 5
IV. Tkm LwNEs
Having examined the adversary system and the criminal defense
attorney, we must now examine the ethical standards which support
the system. Let us follow Attorney X through a mythical case. De-
fendant, charged with an atrocious murder, seeks X's services. Be-
cause of an "overload of work," X declines to take the case. According
to Canon 81 of the American Bar Association's "Canons of Professional
Ethics," X has every right to so decide.
20
Although the individual lawyer does not have a responsibility to
represent every case, the bar association as a whole must see that every
accused receives counsel 27 Defendant requests that the court assign
counsel. X is assigned. X goes before the judge and explains that,
although his work-load has decreased, the unpopularity of the
atrocious slaying has caused extreme enmity and that his practice will
suffer if he has to take the case. The judge refuses to revoke the as-
signment. X now has the task of defending a man whose guilt appears
apparent and whose cause is most unpopular. What are the ethical
considerations involved here?
First, there is the nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Counsel and client are not confederate in pari delicto, nor is counsel even
the agent of his client .... The sole function of counsel in any court
is that of an advocate: be is to plead his client's case on the record
24 Ibid.
25 rd. at 9.
20 American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 31:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as advisor or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employ-
ment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what em-
ployment he will accept as counsel .... He cannot escape it by urging
as an excuse that he is only following his client's instructions.2 7 Report, supra note 12.
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before the Court. To a degree, therefore, the relation of a lawyer to his
client is not inaptly suggested by the sobriquet 'mouthpiece' ...how-
ever ...counsel has a higher duty than to be the mere conduit pipe
between his client and the Court. He is not bound to put forward his
client's case, which is acquittal .. since counsel speaks for the accused,
it follows that what he says in court on behalf of his client is not, and
should not be taken to be his own opinion or the expression of his own
mind... .. It follows that there can be no question of a lawyer's being
an accessory of his client whether before or after the fact.28
Also, it is not the attorney's ethical duty to pass on the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Says Canon 5, "It is the right of the lawyer
to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused."29 The attorney
has offered himself as an expert on legal rights, not as an expert on
moral obligations. In reality, the lawyer may know far less of moral
rights than his client. Morality is an elusive concept. Even the so-
called basics or universals are not agreed upon. It is not the lawyer's
function to pass judgment on his client in the nebulous realm of
morals. "A client is entitled to say to his counsel, 'I want your ad-
vocacy, not your judgment, I prefer the judgment of the Court.'"
Charles P. Curtis, Boston attorney, had this point brought vividly
home to him while talking one morning with Arthur Hill who had
handled the appeal of Sacco and Vanzetti.
One morning I was stupid enough to ask him an indiscreet question. I
had expressed my own opinion on the guilt or innocence of Sacco and
Vanzetti. I said I thought that on the whole it seemed to me probable
that they had been guilty, and I asked Arthur what he thought. Arthur
looked at me, it was years later, twenty years later, and he smiled and
said, 'I have never said, and I cannot say, what I think on that subject
because, you see, Charlie, I was their counsel.'3o
Semantically, it is impossible for a lawyer to know that his client
is guilty. "Guilty" is a decision upon an indictment brought by a com-
petent court of law after a trial or guilty plea. For a lawyer to know
that his client is guilty the client must have already been convicted.
The essential question revolves around the matter of proof in a court
of law. Proof is seldom a black or white matter. The fact that de-
fendant may have done a particular act has no probative force until
a thousand and one extenuating factors are also established. Quentin
Reynolds wrote in the Courtroom this about attorney Samuel S.
Leibowitz:
The fact that a man pulled the trigger and was found standing over the
body of his victim with the gun in his hand did not make him guilty
28 Orkin, Defense of One Known to Be Guilty, 1 Crim. L. Q. 170-171 (1958).29 American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics.30 Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 17 (1951).
[Vol. 52,
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per se in the eyes of Leibowitz. He asked himself a hundred questions.
What was the provocation? What was the mental state of the defendant
at the time he committed the act? What were his early family back-
ground, his education, his medical history? .. . District attorneys, smart-
ing under the lash of defeats administered to them by Leibowitz,
were understandably discomfited. They often said bitterly that because
of him murderers were walking the streets, free to kill or rob again.
Leibowitz always answered such criticism by reminding them that only
in inefficient, bungling prosecution would allow a guilty man to escape
the consequences of his crime.
31
Indeed, Earl Rogers felt that it was every criminal lawyer's desire
to defend a man innocent in fact, but that clearly innocent men more
often than not do not come to trial.32 Under our laws, our expert
investigation, our highly trained personnel, and our grand juries, not
many innocent men are falsely arrested and indicted, thought Earl
Rogers.
33
It is doubtful, though, that many lawyers share the following
views on "guilt":
In my vocabulary there is no such word as 'guilt' and no such thing
as moral wrong. Believing that the law of cause and effect reaches
through every part of the universe-believing that men and women do
what was set down for them to do and what was indestructibly woven
through the whole warp and woof of life, I come to but one conclu-
sion-no one deserves wither praise or blame. In my defense of men
and women I have sought to bring courts and juries to understand the
philosophy which I think is largely responsible for what success I have
had. Often my clients did not do the things with which they were
charged; sometimes they did do them, and then I tried to make courts
and juries understand the reasons why.34
Certainly, the factors of heredity and environment must be given
a proper place in the scheme of causation but it is not necessary
to believe in complete determinism to correctly approach "guilt."
Even if the lawyer were charged with the responsibility for de-
termining the defendant's innocence as a prerequisite to handling
the case, the tools available for investigation are inadequate and
impractical. Each lawyer would have to do large amounts of original
research; he would have to spend hours in costly investigation. In
essence, he would then have to become investigator, prosecutor, de-
fense counselor, and twelve jurors rolled into one, and all before the
case was accepted or rejected. It is true that any good defense coun-
selor plays all these roles in preparing his case. But even with the
relatively comprehensive procedures available today, the attorney
31 Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 18 at 39-40.
32 St. Johns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 68.
33 Ibid .34 Darrow, op. cit. supra note 14, at 425.
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can never be entirely certain about his client's guilt in fact. Serjeant
Robinson illustrated the, at best, provisional nature of a pre-trial
value-judgment on the guilt of a client:
I have frequently been engaged in a case for the defense which, on a
perusal of the brief, I have thought to be utterly hopeless, and have
believed my client to be not quite so honest as he should be; but
afterwards, on the facts being thoroughly sifted before a judge and
jury, I have been just as firmly convinced that my first impression was
utterly erroneous.8 5
Earle Stanley Gardner states that it is the function of the defense
counsel to "help protect the innocent, particularly where the circum-
stances pointing toward guilt seem overwhelming."36 In a leaflet dis-
tributed to the Chicago Bar Association, Mr. Gardner detailed a few
experiences he had had with guilty men-imprisoned men-who were
later, through various circumstances found to be not guilty after all.82
Even in situations where the defendant has confessed his guilt, the
actual guilt of the defendant, is far from certain. Sometimes confes-
sions are the product of various types of coercion and, therefore, may
not be reliable. Sometimes the innocent's confessions are the result
of a deep-seated guilt complex. Police records are amply full of
confessions by individuals who had absolutely nothing to do with
the confessed crime. Behind the obvious and logical lies a dark abyss
of irrational subleties.
Another practical factor to consider here is the attitude of the
criminal defense attorneys toward their job. One characteristic that
runs through the personality of defense lawyers is a revulsion against
outside pressure, the stubborn resistance to arbitrary assertion of au-
thority. Most defense attorneys understand and deplore the caprice
of the masses. In a sense, the criminal defense lawyer is a symbol of
independence and a safety valve for dissent.38
Earl Rogers was asked why he had defended with such vigor
Charlie Mootry-a man he felt to be guilty.
He had felt sorry for Mootry, much as he despised him, because he said
he had been spawned in hell and grown under a rock and society had
no right to let a man grow under a rock and then condemn him be-
cause he came out crippled, with a brain as fiat as a snake's. Men
driven beyond the breaking point, the man who cannot fight because
he has no words and no character ... 39
35 Robinson, Bench & Bar Reminiscences 116 (1889).
36 Gardner, The Case of the "Guilty Client," (A leaflet published by the
Chicago Bar Ass'n).
37 Ibid.; For extensive collections of cases involving erroneous convictions of
innocent persons whose guilt seemed clear, see Gardner, The Court of Last Re-
sort (Cardinal ed. 1957).38 Steinberg, supra note 20, at 23.
9 St. Johns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 155.
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Sympathy, empathy, whatever you want to call it, is a most im-
portant factor in the criminal attorney's defense of the apparently
guilty or the unpopular. Certainly in a society that has grown so
complex and impersonal, in a world that is harried by the thought
of nuclear holocaust, and in a world where the majority of men begin
life on the wrong foot, sympathy should have a place in the law.
Darrow said of his efforts that he hoped he had "done something to
help human understanding, to temper justice with mercy, to over-
come hate with love."40
Let us return to our hypothetical of Attorney X and the defendant
charged with the atrocious slaying. What if Attorney X had found
conclusive proof that the defendant had done that for which he was
charged, and the defendant readily admitted it with a contemptuous,
"I did it and I am glad"? All of the evidence was circumstantial; At-
torney X knew that he could thoroughly discredit prosecution's evi-
dence. Also, Attorney X had discovered in defendant's record a series
of similar charges for all of which defendant had escaped conviction
through technicalities. Is it not true that Attorney X, besides having
a duty to his client and a duty to the court, has a duty to society
by virue of being a member of society? As a citizen, is it not At-
torney X's responsibility, since defendant's guilt is so certain and his
past record so ignominious, to see to it that defendant does not
escape punishment for this crime? The Canons are not at all clear
in answering this particular question. Canon 15 reads in part:
In the judicial form the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land,
and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand
of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane.
He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.41
Canon 5 reads in part:
Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land per-
mits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but
by due process of law.42
Additionally, in the Oath of Admission recommended by the
American Bar Association are these words: "I will not counsel or
maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be
40 Darrow; Attorney For the Damned 87 (Weinberg, Simon & Shuster, ed.
1957).4 1 American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics.
42 Ibid.
1964] NOTES
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly de-
batable under the law of the land."
43
The only thing that is clear in these phrases is that the language
is sufficiently ambiguous for a rationalization either way. Apparently
the answer lies outside the exact words of the canons and oath. The
answer is found again in the nature of the adversary system. The
potential criminal defense attorney must ask himself if he believes
in the adversary system, its basic procedures and safeguards. If not,
then he must either refrain from criminal defense work or strive to
have the system converted to one which he considers more nearly
approximates justice. In the meantime, he must follow the essential
guidelines of the system. As we have said, the presumption of in-
nocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the con-
comitant right to an adequate defense are two of the basic principles
of the adversary system. The third fundamental is the distinct roles
played by advocate, judge, and jury. Attorney X is not only defend-
ing the rights of a client, he is also upholding the Anglo-American
system of justice. Once he stands before the criminal bar, Attorney X
must guarantee in reality each client his basic rights.
V. TB:E FINAL Acr-JusTicE COMES TO TBE SUPERMARKET
The crux of the ethical problem revolves around the ultimate
purpose of the rule that even the "guilty" and the unpopular deserve
the best defense possible.
The purpose of the rule is to preserve the integrity of society itself. It
aims at keeping sound and wholesome the procedures by which society
visits its condemnation on an erring member ...
It marks society's determination to keep unsoiled and beyond sus-
picion the procedures by which men are condemned for a violation of
its laws....
The lawyer appearing on behalf of an accused person is not present
in court merely to represent his client. He represents a vital interest of
society itself, he plays an essential role in one of the fundamental
processes of an ordered community.
4 4
Certainly the bar associations have immense responsibility to
clear up the misunderstandings existing in their own ranks and in
the general public. If an individual lawyer assumes the task of de-
fending the apparently guilty or the unpopular:
The legal profession should in any event strive to promote and maintain
a moral atmosphere in which he may render this service without tuinous
cost to himself. No member of the bar should indulge in public criti-
cism of another lawyer because he has undertaken the representation
4 3 Drinker, Legal Ethics 147 (1953).44 Talks on American Law, op. cit. supra note 12, at 35, 37.
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of causes in general disfavor. Every member of the profession should,
on the contrary, do what he can to promote a public understanding of
the services rendered by the advocate in such situations.
45
William M. Kunstler, a New York attorney, has written a "profiles
in courage" for the defense attorney. In The Case For Courage," he
lists a few of America's great defenses: Andrew Hamilton's defense
of John Peter Zenger who in 1735 was charged with printing libel
about the Governor of New York; John Adams' defense of nine Brit-
ish soldiers tried in 1770 for killing five colonists in Boston; William
Seward's introduction of the insanity plea on behalf of William
Freeman, a Negro on trial for murder in 1846; Senator Reverdy John-
son's defense of Mrs. Mary Surratt at the court martial trial following
Lincoln's assassination; Clarence Darrow's representation of Eugene
Debs at the latter's conspiracy trial for leading the Pullman strike in
1895; William G. Thompson's appellate arguments on behalf of Sacco
and Vanzetti between 1924 and 1927; and Harold Medina's defense
of Anthony Cramer at the latter's treason trial in 1942 involving aid
to Nazi saboteurs who had landed in America. Although there have
been many more famous and deserving defenses, these examples do
form a basis for a scrutiny of a few of those lawyers who have de-
fended the "guilty" and the unpopular. It is true that each lawyer
was criticized for undertaking the defense, and, in some cases, was
bitterly denounced in the press. Most of the lawyers were aware that
their practices or political prospects might be injured. But the ulti-
mate success of most of these men indicates that such defenses were
not destructive to their careers. Adams became President; Seward
became Secretary of State; Johnson became ambassador to Great
Britain; Darrow was immortalized; Medina became a federal judge.
There was an element of egocentricity in their defenses since
they were defending celebrated causes. Some were bored with reg-
ular practice, and some saw the causes as means of advancing their
own ideological views. And, they rightly felt that such action-if the
case were large enough-usually earns esteem of their peers at the
bar with the passing of time. Yet all was not milk and honey. Most
of the lawyers were young, without clientele, and without reputa-
tion. Only in this light do these men have relevance to the modern
criminal practitioner whose professional lives are not so luminous
as the timeless greats. For the responsibility of the lawyer's defense
of the "guilty" and the unpopular to have any true meaning as a prin-
ciple, it must be viewed in light of those lawyers whose careers do
45 Report, supra note 12.46 Kunstler, The Case For Courage (1961).
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not lead to the presidency or to fame but to the merely unheralded
and oft times non-lucrative defense of a series of accused. Given the
state of criminal defense practice today, the men exampled by Mr.
Kunstler have one message. COURAGE. Not the "courage" that is
avoided in real life by that siren rationale of the average lawyer,
"Il build my practice first, and when I am a senior figure beyond
reproach, then I'll defend the unpopular," but the courage of the
young-without a vast clientele or reputation-who believe in the
importance and nobility of their profession and undertake the de-
fense of the "guilty" and the unpopular.
It is ironic that the term "courage" should be applied to those
who merely fulfill the ethics of their profession. The law student is
constantly reminded by some of the hoary members of the bar that
law is basically a business which must show a profit at the end of
the year. As Professor Llewellyn stated, "There is a brand of lawyer
for whom law is the making of a livelihood .... Coin is success, coin
is prestige, and coin is power.... Coin is, in this society, the measure
of the man."47 Strong is the temptation to avoid risks when the com-
pensation is inadequate. The slighting of the numerous indigents and
clients who can pay only a token fee, by the failure of individual
lawyers and the bar associations to exercise due diligence and fervor,
presents a serious gap in criminal justice, and "equal justice under
law" becomes a Disneyland reality. To those of the limited, monetary
view, it is the duty of the more responsible members of the bar to
establish a proper balance between bread and dreams by exhorting
the long and lofty tradition of public service inherent in the law.
We live in the age of the supermarket. The watchwords are
efficiency, speed, and impersonality. It is an age of "organization
men"48 using "hidden persuaders"49 on a "lonely crowd""9 that has
been classified "a nation of sheep."51 Intellectuals write of a generation
that is "growing up absurd,"52 or of a mass feeling of "alienations."
53
Perhaps in this context of contemporary chaos, the legal professions
significant contribution will be an uncommon respect for the indi-
vidual and a steadfast perseverance in the defense of the individual's
rights regardless of the apparent "guilt" or the unpopularity of the
accused. If justice is to prevail in the supermarket, modem mettle
must be exercised. Indeed, the lawyer has a personal stake in the
47Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 119 (1951).48 Whyte, The Organization Man (Anchor el. 1956).
4 9Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (Anchor ed. 1958).5Oliesman, The Lonely Crowd (1953).51 Lederer, Nation of Sheep (1950).
52 Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (Vintage Books ed. 1962).
53 Jaspers, Man in The Modem Age (Anchor ed. 1957).
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outcome. As Al Dewlen, in the Twilight of Honor, has one of his
characters say:
Jack made one of the most incisive speeches on criminal law rve ever
heard. . . . I'll never forget it. He was talking about the necessary,
knowing defense of the guilty. It can be destructive of the defender,
he said, unless he's a man of two philosophies, two souls. The single-
minded man, he said, can fall into a neither world, a place, Jack spoke
of as 'the twilight of honor,' and once there, he's unlikely to emerge.
5 4
William B. Martin
54Dewlen, Twilight of Honor 189 (Signet ed. 1963).
